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In this paper I will argue that some of the key features associated with modern liberal 
political orders — particularly in the areas of religious toleration and cultural pluralism 
— are the result of specific political and legal arrangements arrived at by European states 
in order to contain religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. As such, 
liberal political and legal regimes contain features which are irreducible to their main 
modern forms of philosophical justification, some indeed which conflict with such 
justifications. One can of course respond to this state of affairs by declaring the actual 
historical arrangements to be merely factual or “non-ideal” in relation to the normative or 
ideal domain of political or moral philosophy. To do this, however, is to risk overlooking 
the normative dimensions of the historical arrangements themselves — in this case the 
early modern religious settlements. But it is also to risk a kind of philosopher’s self-
delusion, in which it is imagined that political norms arrived at through rational 
introspection have an intrinsic moral force, regardless of their capacity to engage the 
historical political-legal order and the personae engaged in its day-to-day operations. This 
paper explores the contrary course. It offers a sketch of the political and legal order 
established by some of the early modern religious settlements, and then argues its 
salience for understanding the character of multi-religious and multi-cultural governance 
in certain modern liberal states, with particular reference to such religious offences as 
sacrilege and blasphemy. 
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The post-Kantian political philosophies developed by John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas can be cited in passing as prime examples of modern philosophies that fail to 
engage the political and legal orders arising from the early modern settlements, except to 
declare them in need of philosophical reconstruction or historical supercession. Rawls 
and Habermas are not topics of discussion in the present paper, and they are mentioned 
here only to illustrate the gap between modern justifications for liberal-democratic 
politics and the forms in which liberal political orders first emerged from the settlements 
that brought an end to religious civil war at the end of the seventeenth century. Despite 
important differences in method, Rawls and Habermas both assume that the heart of 
liberalism lies in justice, understood in terms of principles of political and social rights 
grounded in the rational consent of democratic citizens. On this view, the political and 
legal arrangements imposed by early liberal orders — toleration measures, church-state 
separation — will not be properly legitimate until they have been freely chosen by 
rational individuals who will see them as necessary for their own exercise of reason 
(Forst 2003). Yet, as Raymond Geuss has pointed out, the central norm of much early 
modern political thought was not justice but security or social peace (Geuss 2002). 
Further, many early architects of religious toleration regarded the notion of a single 
universal reason not as the foundation but as a threat to the cultural pluralism required for 
toleration, which they sought to ground in a suitably de-confessionalised political and 
legal regime, regardless of whether this was democratic (Hunter 2004; Thomasius 2004). 
If modern philosophical liberalism is significantly disengaged from the historical 
architecture of toleration and pluralism, however, then its communitarian critics are even 
more so. This is because they take Rawls at his word and assume that he is indeed the 
philosophical architect of the liberal political order, so that in attacking his philosophical 
discourse they are attacking something called liberalism. Catholic and Communitarian 
philosophers have thus taken it on themselves to attack something called liberal 
individualism, by treating this as the unfortunate product of the fracturing of communal 
moral identity during the Reformation (MacIntyre 1981). They have also criticised the 
supposed rational neutrality of the liberal conception of justice, in particular its attempt to 
ground religious freedom in the exercise of free rational choice, rather than in the right to 
pursue a substantive good characteristic of a group moral identity (Sandel 1998; Galeotti 
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1999). And finally they have attacked the presumed neutrality of key aspects of the 
liberal order itself, specifically the separation of church and state, arguing that this is 
simply a disguised moral commitment, similar to the commitment to theocracy, and that 
only full democracy can resolve the question of which commitment should determine the 
political order (Bader 1999). If, however, the emergent liberal order was not grounded in 
a conception of justice — Kantian or Aristotelian — then much of the communitarian 
critique of liberalism is beside the point, regardless of its standing as a critique of Rawls. 
Further, if security and social peace did indeed play a key role in motivating and 
justifying liberal arrangements for toleration and the separation of church and state, then 
it is idle to attack early liberalism for lacking substantive norms, even if these norms are 
not those of a moral community, are quite unlike Aristotelian conceptions of an inherent 
moral telos, and could not possibly have been arrived at through democratic deliberation. 
The reason that early liberalism looks so unlike that which Rawls defends and the 
communitarians attack is that it was not based in a set of arguments about the nature of 
human reason and morality. Rather, it was based in a set of political and legal measures 
designed to address a particular historical situation characteristic of central and western 
European states during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This situation was that of 
religious civil war in France and England, and, in the German Empire, a mix of two kinds 
of religious war, civil and inter-state. In what follows, it is argued that the key elements 
of early liberalism — varying degrees of toleration and church-state separation — formed 
part of the religious settlements that brought these wars to an end, a symptom of which 
was the increasing redundancy of such religious crimes as heresy, witchcraft and 
blasphemy. These settlements, it is argued, laid down the central cultural, political and 
legal protocols for the liberal governance of multi-religious societies. And if we are to 
understand the role of these protocols in the governance of emerging multi-cultural 
societies, then we must attend to their historical gravity and force, rather than to their 
philosophical defence or critique. To do this, I will begin by briefly looking at the context 
in which religious offences operated in pre-liberal confessional states, then sketch the 
manner in which such offences were displaced by the terms of the religious settlements, 
before concluding by looking at recent discussion of the crime of blasphemy in the 
context of multi-cultural societies. 
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Religious Offences and the Sacral State 
Throughout the medieval and early modern period, European Christianity was more than 
just a spiritual locus. It was a formidable earthly force. It exercised direct political and 
juridical power through an archipelago of armed prince-bishops, the diocesan structure 
being in fact the footprints left by Christian warriors as the made their way across 
Europe, stamping out ‘paganism’ in the early middle ages (Bartlett 1993: 5-23). And it 
exercised indirect power through secular princes, who enforced the law of the most 
powerful prince-bishop — the bishop of Rome — as part of their exercise of lordship 
(Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Under these circumstances, where there was no clear distinction 
between the religious and political community or between the Christian and the citizen, 
religious offences were at once spiritual transgressions and a judicial felonies, attracting 
severe criminal punishment. 
We can suggest, then, that such sacrilegious offences as heresy, witchcraft and 
blasphemy emerged as sins and crimes in Western Europe as the result of a particular set 
of cultural and political circumstances: broadly, those of a transcendent sacralising 
religion exercising overwhelming political and juridical powers, both through its own 
authority and that of the secular prince or emperor. There are two broad factors to take 
into account. In the first place, as the obverse of the sacred, sacrilege was a powerful and 
authentic expression of core Christian sacramental practices, finding expression in both 
popular devotion and elite theological speculation. A common focus was provided by 
those earthly things held to be bearers of the transcendent divinity — the church and 
within the church the Eucharistic host — which, as the most sacred and beneficial of 
things, were also the most vulnerable to profanation and degradation. Thus, in many parts 
of late-medieval Europe, as the magical source of God’s blessing on the community, the 
host was paraded through the village and fields in early spring to ensure a good harvest 
(Baur 1992). Concomitantly, the allegation of sacrilegious profanation of the host was the 
routine way of triggering murderous Christian pogroms against local Jewish 
communities, non-believers whose polluting proximity to the circle of communicants 
threatened communication with God (Nirenberg 1996). 
Second, if sacrilege was deeply rooted in sacramental religious practice, then 
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it underwent a major elaboration and 
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codification in canon law, where it was linked to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft. This 
was the time at which the university canonists of Northern Italy developed a common 
legal process for dealing with this array of crimes; a process that could be initiated by 
denunciation, deployed oaths of veridiction, permitted the regulated use of torture to 
obtain evidence, denied appeal, and could result in the death sentence (Trusen 1992). The 
extension of canon and Roman law across Western Europe during this period resulted in 
a centralised system of legal authority, permitting the papacy to exert religious and civil 
jurisdiction via local clerical and secular authorities (Padoa-Schioppa 1997). Sacrilege 
thus came to be prosecuted in a much more systematic manner and, because of its linkage 
to heresy, blasphemy and witchcraft, participated in a cross-referring nexus of religious 
criminality. Heretics were thus routinely denounced as sacrilegious, their guilt being 
proved by the fact that they performed mock masses, feasted on Eucharistic wafers, 
broke crucifixes, declared Jesus to be a fraud, and so on. And those on trial for sacrilege 
were routinely denounced as heretics, their profane acts being indicative of their secret 
adherence to erroneous and ungodly beliefs. 
The presence of sacrilegious religious offences in early modern Europe was thus 
symptomatic of a tightly woven and far-flung matrix of sacramental practices, juridical 
procedures, and authority structures, anchored ecclesiastically in the papacy and 
politically in the Holy Roman Empire. Despite the relative civil autonomy of the 
Northern Italian city states, elsewhere in Europe this matrix resulted in a virtual super-
imposition of the sacramental community on the civil community. Threats to the 
sacramental community resulting from sacrilege, heresy and blasphemy, once proved by 
the ecclesiastical courts, were subject to the harshest of punishments by the civil 
authorities. Conversely, threats to civil authority were themselves treated as analogous to 
sacrilege against the sacred person of the prince, who was God’s viceroy on earth 
(Kantorowicz 1957). It is this very superimposition of the sacramental and civil 
communities, however, that explains the intensity and uncontrollability of the religious-
political conflicts that followed from the splitting of the church at the beginning of the 
16th century. For once the heresy that would become the Protestant church had escaped 
the juridical and political machinery designed to contain such outbreaks, Protestant 
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princes immediately used this machinery to defend their religion against the Roman 
church and against rival Protestant churches and sects. 
Given that faith communities were demarcated by the border between the sacred 
and the profane — between true believers and the heretical monsters — the civil conflicts 
that erupted across Europe assumed a specifically religious intensity, as those one sought 
to exterminate were not just political enemies but polluting threats to the sacramental 
community and its capacity to communicate with God (Crouzet 1990). Further, this 
sacramental violence was made all the more difficult to control by the fact that the new 
religion differed from the old both in its construction of the sacred and therefore in its 
sense of sacrilege. The Calvinists in particular stressed the transcendence and 
inscrutability of God, rejecting the notion of real presence in the Eucharist, and regarding 
other forms of Catholic immanentism — rituals, processions, pilgrimages, relics — as 
sacrilegious idolatry, making sacrilege itself into a flashpoint for sacramental violence. In 
June 1528, for example, the first act of Calvinist iconoclasm in Paris — the vandalising 
of an image of the Virgin — was answered by an act of Catholic ritual cleansing, as all 
parishes and the university organised processions to atone for this sacrilege (Ramsey 
1999: 8). Ritual burnings, disembowelments, and massacres were soon to follow, as 
France descended in a series of religious civil wars in which both sides viewed the 
extermination of the other as necessary for cleansing a spiritual pollution and restoring 
the purity of the sacramental community. 
At the same time, however, the very ferocity of this violence, which threatened the 
survival of the state itself, led Bodin and the politiques to make the first attempts to 
separate religious and political community, by developing a secular conception of 
sovereignty. We can see this in terms with which the Chancellor Michel de L’Hôpital 
addressed a peace colloquium during the first war of religion in 1562: 
It is not a question of establishing the faith, but of regulating the state. It is 
possible to be a citizen without being a Christian. You do not cease to be a 
subject of the King when you separate from the Church. We can live in 
peace with those who do not observe the same ceremonies. (L'Hôpital 
1824-5: I, 425) 
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In fact Chancellor L’Hôpital’s words proved to be in vain in the French context, as 
France would eventually solve the problem of religious conflict by suppressing then 
eliminating the French Calvinists or Huguenots. Nonetheless, they pointed forward to a 
profound change — the uncoupling of political governance from Christianity spirituality 
— which would radically transform the character of the sacred and of sacrilege.  
The Spiritualising of Religion and the Desacralising of Law and Politics 
During the 17th century France, England, and the German Empire were all faced with the 
same set of problems: how to achieve religious peace and how to establish stable rule in 
territories containing bitterly divided religious communities. The measures that evolved 
to meet these problems — religious toleration being just the tip of the iceberg — would 
alter the disposition of the sacred and lead to the sidelining of sacrilege (together with 
heresy and, eventually, blasphemy) within an increasingly autonomous civil domain. 
Unfortunately for the historian, these developments differed significantly both within the 
German Empire and between England and France, so that there is no typical case. In 
order to keep my exposition manageable, I will thus focus on developments in the 
German states — Brandenburg-Prussia in particular — making do with just a few 
comparative remarks on England and France, acknowledging upfront the element of 
historical bias thus introduced. 
The developments that saw the institution of religious peace within the German 
Empire were piecemeal, protracted, and never fully successful. Nonetheless, we can 
detect a pattern of development in the century that separated the Religious Peace of 
Augsburg of 1555 and the more permanent Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In bringing an 
end to the Thirty Years War, Westphalia declared that henceforth all three main 
confessions — Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism — would be recognised and 
tolerated under imperial law, albeit within the limits of a complex set of arrangements 
intended to stabilise a particular distribution of religious communities both within and 
between states. In his account of this multiplex process, the German historian of church 
law, Martin Heckel, points to a number of key elements: the relegation of theology in 
favour of European public law as the key discourse in the peace negotiations; the gradual 
acceptance of the permanence of heresy by leading negotiators, even if the churches 
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would have none of this; and, most important of all, the dropping of religious truth as a 
criterion for peace in the great treaties, and its replacement by a quite different kind of 
norm for legitimacy: namely, the attainment of social peace (Heckel 1989; Heckel 1992). 
In making social peace the prime duty of the sovereign — as opposed to defending the 
faith or enforcing religious law as God’s earthly viceroy — these developments led to a 
profound secularisation of the political domain. Yet, as Heckel has argued, this was not a 
secularisation driven by some all-embracing secularist philosophy (in the manner of the 
French philosophes), but one carried forward by many anonymous jurists and statesmen 
who remained devoted Christians (Heckel 1984). Far from attempting to expunge 
Christianity, their prime objective was to secure the survival of their own confessions in 
the face of wholesale religious slaughter. Yet they gradually accepted that for this to 
happen it would be necessary to separate the church’s pursuit of salvation from the state’s 
aim of worldly security. 
In the case of post-Westphalian Brandenburg-Prussia, this led to a profound dual 
transformation of the religious and political landscape. On the one hand, there was 
remarkable desacralisation of politics, as jurisconsults and political philosophers attached 
to the court began to reconstruct the objectives of the state in quasi-Hobbesian terms; that 
is, in terms of maintaining external and internal security while eschewing all higher-level 
religious and moral aims. On the other hand, there was a no less remarkable 
spiritualisation of religion, as the Pietists aided by important lay theologians attempted to 
undermine the whole idea of religious orthodoxy — that is, the idea that salvation was 
tied to a particular set of theological doctrines and sacramental practices — arguing 
instead that salvation came instead from a purely personal inner relation to God. 
The manner in which this dual desacralisation of politics and spiritualisation of 
religion transformed the prior construction of sacrilege, heresy, and witchcraft can be 
seen in the writings of Christian Thomasius, professor of law at the University of Halle in 
the late 17th century, lay theologian, and jurisconsult to the Brandenburg-Prussian court. 
In his works attacking the legal prosecution of heresy, witchcraft and sacrilege, 
Thomasius argued along two convergent paths. First, in keeping with his Epicurean form 
of Protestantism, Thomasius attacked what he called the visible church, understood as a 
public institution whose doctrines and rituals are necessary for salvation, arguing instead 
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that the true church is invisible, known by no outward doctrinal or liturgical signs, with 
its members permanently scattered across the globe. This was in effect an attempt to 
detach salvation from the church, and it removed the theological grounds of heresy and 
sacrilege by (in effect) denying that God was mediated by specific sacred doctrines or by 
sacred rituals in holy places (Thomasius 1705). Second, in keeping with the quasi-
Hobbesian conception of politics which he had learned from his mentor Samuel 
Pufendorf, Thomasius argued that the state had no religious objectives and must be 
restricted to the ends of maintaining domestic peace and external security (Thomasius 
1701; Thomasius 1705). For this reason, there should be no laws against sacrilege, heresy 
and witchcraft as such, unless the actions associated with them gave rise to violence or 
civil disorder, in which case they would be punished for that reason, and not because they 
profaned the community of the faithful (Thomasius 1701). 
Unlike his more famous contemporary John Locke, Thomasius did not base his 
arguments for toleration on the philosophical notion of natural rights, but on the dual 
imperatives to spiritualise religion and desacralise the state, whose overarching goal was 
not personal liberty but the stable governance of multi-confessional societies (Dreitzel 
1997). More generally, we can say that Thomasius’s Epicurean Christianity and 
Hobbesian politics were held together not by a philosophical doctrine grounded in human 
reason, but by a cultural-political strategy designed to address a particular set of 
circumstances. We gain a good insight into the character of this strategy via the key use 
Thomasius makes of the category of adiaphora (Thomasius 1705). Adiaphora refers to 
things neither commanded nor forbidden by God, hence morally indifferent in the sense 
of being irrelevant to salvation. As the result of his highly personalist Epicurean style of 
Christianity, Thomasius declared virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its 
liturgies, sacraments and theological doctrines — to be morally indifferent with regards 
to salvation. On the one hand, this meant that forms of worship were a matter of 
“Christian freedom”, to be left to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent 
that they posed no threat to social peace. On the other hand, it also meant that should any 
form of worship pose a threat to public peace then, as something morally indifferent, it 
was legitimately subject to the civil sovereign, who had absolute authority over all 
matters capable of threatening public order. The object of this dual strategy was not to 
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defend individual freedom of conscience as such; rather, it was to deprive the churches of 
all civil and political authority, thereby removing the instruments of their mutual 
religious persecution, and establishing a de-confessionalised state as the means of 
maintaining a legally enforced toleration between the rival religious communities. In 
Brandenburg-Prussia, it was this dual strategy that led to the disappearance of such 
religious offences as heresy and witchcraft and the transformation of others, such as 
blasphemy, into public order offences no longer grounded in sacrilege. 
Thomasius thus marks the moment at which, after a century-and-a-half of religious 
war, the web of canon laws which had tied the political to the religious community began 
to be unpicked, allowing the persona of the citizen to be differentiated from that of the 
Christian; although even in Western Europe this moment was neither epochal nor 
universal. In late seventeenth-century England, religious peace was achieved in a quite 
different way: not by dismantling the confessional state, but by rebuilding it in a more 
stable, less persecutory form. This was achieved in accordance with two broad strategies. 
First, the Anglican church that was to be established as the state religion was purged of 
enough Anglo-Catholic theology to bring back on board moderate Calvinists, providing a 
stable religious middle-ground. Second, using a combination of test acts and toleration 
acts, non-conforming Protestants and Catholics were excluded from office-holding in the 
Anglican state, while permitted freedom of private worship. While this set of strategies 
proved no less successful in securing religious peace than those used in Brandenburg-
Prussia, its effect on the laws pertaining to heresy, witchcraft, sacrilege and blasphemy 
was far less dramatic and uniform. While heresy and witchcraft laws were repealed 
during the 18th century, blasphemy remained a common law crime as a means of 
protecting the state religion, leading it to form a new juridical series with sedition and 
obscenity. Nonetheless, here too blasphemy progressively lost its basis in sacrilege, 
gradually assuming the form of a public order offence, with the result that blasphemy 
prosecutions became increasingly rare. 
Blasphemy and Multi-Cultural Societies 
As a result of the broad developments just discussed, in those Western European-based 
jurisdictions where sacrilege and blasphemy laws remained on the books, they lost their 
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religious character. As these laws evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth century, it was 
no longer the violation of persons, things and places inhabited by a transcendent divinity 
that defined the crime, but something else altogether: the giving of offence in a manner 
that might lead to civil disorder or violence. This sea change allows what were formerly 
religious offences to be either abolished or, if harmful conduct remains, to be sanctioned 
by non-religious public order and anti-discrimination laws. This is the tendency that 
informs the 1985 report of the United Kingdom’s Law Commission, which recommends 
abolition of the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel on the 
grounds that they are archaic offences presenting unjustified infringements of the right to 
freedom of speech (Commission 1985). The same sense of historical development 
informs work of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, in its Blasphemy 
Report of 1994. The Commissioners thus argue that the key element of the law — that of 
offensiveness likely to cause civil disturbance — obviates the need for a special law on 
blasphemy, as this element is well covered by other public-order and anti-discrimination 
laws (Commission 1994). I would suggest that this kind of recommendation is indicative 
not of a state of affairs in which society has lost touch with the sacred; rather, it is 
indicative of one in which the sacred exists only at the level of society — that is, at the 
level of voluntary religious associations — having been purged from the coercive 
apparatus of the state as a result of the early modern religious settlements. This would be 
in keeping with the fact that the last blasphemy prosecution launched in an Australian 
jurisdiction — namely the action initiated by George Pell, then Catholic Archbishop of 
Melbourne, against a photo-montage called Piss Christ — failed. This was in part 
because the Victorian Supreme Court was unsure whether there was a law against 
blasphemy in Victoria, and in part because even if there were, the montage was unlikely 
to cause pubic unrest (1998). 
It would be a mistake, though, to think that the story ends here, or to assume that 
this line of development is irresistible and destined to be universal. That kind of 
assumption is suited to the view of a universal process of modernisation driven by the 
progressive realisation of humanity’s common capacity for rational self-governance. It is 
not suited to the account we have given, in which toleration and the separation of church 
and state represent a strategic response to a particular historical state of affairs, and which 
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depend upon something as fallible as the institutions of a deconfessionalised liberal state. 
We should not be surprised, then, or take it as sign of anachronism or irrationalism, if 
blasphemy has returned to the political agenda of a liberal state like the United Kingdom. 
One of the pointers to what is at stake in this return is provided by the last blasphemy 
prosecution launched in the United Kingdom. One of only a handful in the twentieth 
century, the case against Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses arose from the complaint 
of a Muslim man and took place in 1991, at a time when Rushdie was under threat of 
religious murder from the Islamic theocracy of Iran. If the circumstances of the 
prosecution point to a novel form of the problem of religious friction — that arising from 
the presence of non-Christian religious communities in Christian or post-Christian 
societies — then the resolution of the case points backwards, towards the specific 
character of the English religious settlement. The charge against Rushdie failed because, 
according to the common law of England, blasphemy may only be committed against the 
Church of England, whose political establishment reflects the character of the Anglican 
Settlement (1991). 
If the Rushdie case was a pointer to the emergence of problems associated with the 
liberal government of a multi-religious and multi-cultural society, then the catastrophe of 
11 September 2001 catapaulted these problems to the forefront of political and legal 
discussion in a way that could scarcely have been imagined at the end of the twentieth 
century. Before that year was out, the British government had introduced the Anti-
terrorism Crime Security Act which, in addition to new police and judicial powers to deal 
with the planning and execution of terrorist acts, had also proposed introducing a crime 
of incitement to religious hatred. This would have been an extension of the existing 
incitement to racial hatred statutes of the Public Order Act 1986 and was aimed at 
increasing the legal protection available to Britain’s Islamic community. Despite 
concerns about the extension of state power, this combination of increasing the state’s 
capacity to deal with external security, while protecting religious freedom as a means of 
forestalling domestic religious conflict, looks very much like the actions of a 
deconfessionalised liberal state. In the event, the incitement to religious hatred provisions 
of the anti-terrorism bill failed to pass through the House of Lords, apparently due to 
worries about freedom of speech. It was this that led Lord Avebury to table a Private 
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Member’s Bill proposing repeal of the existing common law offences of blasphemy and 
blasphemous libel, and the introduction of a new offence of incitement to religious 
hatred. And it was this bill that led to the appointment of a House of Lord’s Select 
Committee to inquire into these issues and, more broadly, into the utility of existing 
religious offences in England and Wales. 
In briefly discussing the Committee’s report, which was published in April 2003, I 
will not attempt to do justice to its often fascinating detail, only to draw out what is 
significant in relation to our historical sketch of the early modern religious settlements. 
The first thing to note is that the Committee was unable to arrive at any positive 
recommendations. While recognising the need to offer increased protection to religious 
communities against vilification, abuse and violence, it was unable to agree on the means 
of doing so, failing to recommend either the abolition of the existing blasphemy laws, or 
the creation of a new offence of incitement to religious hatred (Committee 2003a: 38-9). 
There appear to be several reasons for the Committee’s inability to act, related both to the 
diversity of the submissions it received and, more significantly, to a lack of assurance or 
agreement with regards to the appropriate intellectual framework for arriving at 
judgments on the key issues. 
First, with regards to the diversity of the submissions, it is noteworthy that the 
Islamic Society of Britain recommends retention of the blasphemy law and its extension 
to all religious communities, arguing primarily from the need to protect the Islamic 
community from “Islamophobia”, particularly that instigated by the British National 
Party (Committee 2003b). For its part, the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial 
Harmony argues the need to strengthen laws against incitement to religious hatred, but 
also against “sacrilege and abuse of religious sanctities”, citing as a prime example of 
“filth against Muslims” Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 
however, is not unhappy with the existing law covering incitement to racial hatred — 
from which Judaism benefits as an ethnically based religion — and is more worried by 
the apparent failure of the Crown Prosecution Service to use the law, particularly against 
anti-Jewish attacks by Muslims. The Board is happy for the blasphemy law to remain in 
its current form, as protection of the Church of England, but would support an incitement 
to religious hatred statute in order to extend protection to the Islamic community. For 
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their part, the Anglican and Catholic churches agree that a law against incitement to 
religious hatred should be introduced and, were this to prove successful in protecting 
religious communities, then the blasphemy laws could be repealed. Given this diversity 
of advice, some of arising from religious communities in relations of actual or potential 
conflict, it is not surprising that the Committee could see no clear direction arising from 
the submissions it received. 
Second, the Committee’s uncertainty is compounded by one of the central legal-
intellectual frameworks that it feels compelled to use in its deliberations: namely, that 
provided by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention has not been 
directly accepted into English law but, since the Human Rights Act 1998, it is required 
that judicial bodies must interpret English law in a manner rendering it consistent with 
the Convention. The problem is that it is not readily apparent how England’s religious 
offences laws might be rendered consistent with the Convention. Article 9 of the 
Convention states in part that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion”; while Article 10 stipulates that “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression”; and Article 14 declares that “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (Council 1950). The 
Committee is well aware that were an appeal on a blasphemy case to find its way to 
Strasbourg then the existing common law, with its restriction of protection to the Church 
of England, would be radically incompatible with Article 14. Yet it can see no clear way 
to change the law, because of what it regards as an impossible balancing act imposed by 
the right to have one’s religion protected and the right to freedom of speech. Treating this 
as a quasi-philosophical problem, the Committee finds that it would be very difficult to 
draft laws against incitement to religious hatred that could discriminate between 
illegitimate incitement and the legitimate expression of hostility towards a religion 
(Committee 2003a: 26-7). 
But this difficulty is surely a pointer to a more profound underlying problem, 
namely, the apparent incompatibility between the language of the Convention on Human 
Rights and the terms in which European political and legal orders have dealt with the 
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problems of religious conflict and religious freedom. The Convention uses the language 
of natural right — one might say the language of Locke and Rawls — in order to 
formulate fundamental rights to such things as freedom of religion and freedom of 
speech. And it leaves open the question of how these different rights are to be reconciled, 
and the extent to which they might be limited by security and public order provisos. If the 
history we have sketched is tenable, however, then freedom of religion arose not from 
natural rights but from the measures employed by liberal orders to deal with the problem 
of religious conflict. Toleration measures, for example, emerged as a means of escaping 
the conflict arising from state-sanctioned religious persecution, and involved either 
detaching churches from the institutions of judicial and political authority, or else 
restricting their capacity to use these in a persecutory manner. This was typically 
achieved by offering varying degrees of freedom of worship, not as an unfettered natural 
right, but to the degree required to preserve social peace. As the inheritors of these 
settlements, liberal political and legal orders are not involved in the game of balancing 
potentially conflicting fundamental rights, but in the quite different task of adjusting 
degrees of freedom (whether of speech or religion) in light of an assessment of the likely 
threats to personal and state security arising. The Committee is still in touch with this 
way of thinking, as we can see from the following comment, in which it acknowledges 
that its judgments must be informed by an assessment of the fluctuating level of religious 
tranquility: 
We are a society in which no major religious group, including atheists, 
objects to the presence of others, and there is little friction between the 
leaders of various faiths. It is, however, important to recognise that 
continued tranquility depends not only upon continued mutual tolerance 
but, equally, on equality of protection from intolerance on the basis of 
religion or belief or no belief. So long as the major religious communities 
can pursue their ideas, their beliefs and their practices, and so long as none 
of these cause any undue impact upon the secular segment of society, or 
on each other, a form of stability can be achieved. But this cannot be taken 
for granted. (Committee 2003a: 7) 
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The difficulty is that there is no apparent way of reconciling this way of approaching the 
problem with the language of universal human rights. This gives rise to a remarkable 
state of affairs, in which the actual organisation of the liberal political and juridical order 
remains out of reach of a central mode of modern moral reflection. 
Thirdly, and finally, this is a pointer to the fact that the Committee’s failure to 
arrive at any recommendations appears to reflect a fundamental ambivalence in its own 
thinking about the character of English religious offences. On the one hand, the 
Committee insists that religious offences date from a time in which it was held that 
religious belief was part an parcel of the social and political order, which could not 
survive if people were permitted to express contempt for religion or to violate its laws. 
Since those days are long passed, it is not at all clear that we need religious offences of 
any kind: “Some might regret that, but it does not alter the fact that the law is now 
concerned with the preservation of the peace of the realm, and the concern is not so much 
with views of the deity as with the satisfactory state of society” (Committee 2003a: 46). 
The Committee thus appears sympathetic to those submissions which argue that existing 
public-order offences, covering things like incitement to commit a crime, intimidation, 
assault, and damage to property, should be able to offer all of the protection that 
members of religious communities need, without having to make religious faith part of 
the definition of the crime. This, broadly, is the path taken by the UK Law Commission 
in 1985 and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in 1997, when they 
recommended that the crime of blasphemy be abolished. Finally in this regard, the 
Committee comments that: “It must be appreciated that the definition [of blasphemy] has 
developed historically to meet various, primarily political rather than religious, 
perceptions of a need for the law to protect institutions, originally the State itself”; even if 
this fact is regretted by the Church of England and completely rejected by several 
Evangelical witnesses (Committee 2003a: 47). 
On the other hand, however, elsewhere, the Committee seems far less sure that the 
day of religious offences has passed. In discussing India’s laws against religious 
vilification, for example, the Committee comments that, “The rationale underlying the 
Indian laws was neither antipathy to freedom of speech as such nor the protection of 
public freedom, but the maintenance of public peace and tranquility in a country where 
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religious passions were considered to be easily aroused and inflamed” . Yet, despite its 
own acknowledgement of the contingent character of English religious tranquility, the 
Committee makes no move to draw on the Indian laws. It would appear the reason for 
this reticence lies in an underlying view that “the United Kingdom is not a secular state”, 
and that “religious belief continues to be a significant component, or even determinant, of 
social values, and plays a major role in the lives of a large number of the population” 
(Committee 2003a: 38). For this reason, it is proper to entertain laws that protect not just 
the persons of members of religious communities, but also their faiths as such. This view 
would seem to be in part informed by the traditional conception of England as a state 
whose church is part of its constitution; but also in part by a kind of multi-culturalist 
ideology in which the state should have the role of embodying the religious identities of 
its constituent communities. Oscillating between a view of the laws as fundamentally 
directed towards maintaining the religious peace, and a view in which their role is to 
protect the religious freedom and (multi-)cultural identity of the nation, the Committee is 
in no position to use the former view as a means of grasping the character and limits of 
the latter. 
**** 
What is singularly missing from this spread of views is a sense of the way in which a 
deconfessionalised liberal state uses the criterion of public order as the base-line from 
which to make the necessary discriminations. This is a state whose forms of toleration are 
grounded neither in inalienable individual rights and freedoms, nor in the communal 
identities of its constituent religious communities. Rather, it is one which is defined by its 
task of governing of these communities in a way that pre-empts their mutual persecution. 
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